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In Lands of Foreign Currency Credit, Bank Lending 
Channels Run Through? 
The Effects of Monetary Policy at Home and Abroad on the Currency 
Denomination of the Supply of Credit 
 
Steven Ongena - Ibolya Schindele - Dzsamila Vonnák 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the differential impact of domestic and foreign monetary policy on the local 
supply of bank credit in domestic and foreign currencies. We analyze a novel, supervisory 
dataset from Hungary that records all bank lending to firms including its currency 
denomination. Accounting for time-varying firm-specific heterogeneity in loan demand, we 
find that a lower domestic interest rate expands the supply of credit in the domestic but not 
in the foreign currency. A lower foreign interest rate on the other hand expands lending by 
lowly versus highly capitalized banks relatively more in the foreign than in the domestic 
currency. 
 
Keywords: bank balance-sheet channel, monetary policy, foreign currency lending 
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Működik-e a monetáris politika hitelcsatornája 
devizahiteles országokban?  
A hazai és külföldi monetáris politikák hatása a hitelkínálat 
devizaösszetételére 
 
Steven Ongena - Schindele Ibolya – Vonnák Dzsamila 
 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmányban a hazai és külföldi monetáris politikáknak a hazai bankhitelkínálat 
devizaösszetételére gyakorolt hatását elemezzük. Egy olyan egyedi adatbázist vizsgálunk, 
amely tartalmaz miden magyar vállalati hitelt deviza denominációval együtt. A hitelkereslet 
időben változó cégspecifikus heterogenitására kontrollálva azt találjuk, hogy az alacsonyabb 
hazai kamatláb növeli a hitelkínálatot hazai pénznemben, de nem hat a külföldi devizában 
denominált hitelek kínálatára. Ugyanakkor az alacsonyabb külföldi kamatlábak jobban 
növelik az alacsony kapitalizációjú bankok relatív hitelezését külföldi devizában, mint hazai 
pénznemben a magas kapitalizációjú bankokhoz képest. 
 
Tárgyszavak: hitelcsatorna, monetáris politikák, külföldi devizahitelek 
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Abstract 
 
 
We analyze the differential impact of domestic and foreign monetary policy on the local supply 
of bank credit in domestic and foreign currencies. We analyze a novel, supervisory dataset from 
Hungary that records all bank lending to firms including its currency denomination. Accounting 
for time-varying firm-specific heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that a lower domestic 
interest rate expands the supply of credit in the domestic but not in the foreign currency. A lower 
foreign interest rate on the other hand expands lending by lowly versus highly capitalized banks 
relatively more in the foreign than in the domestic currency. (98 words) 
 
Keywords: Bank balance-sheet channel, monetary policy, foreign currency lending. 
JEL: E51, F3, G21. 
 
 I. Introduction 
Bank lending in a foreign currency to local businesses and households has been a widely 
observed phenomenon in many “dollarized” (or “euroized”) countries around the world, in 
South-America, East Asia, and more recently in Eastern Europe. But also in the Euro area around 
ten percent of credit by resident financial institutions to the non-financial sector is granted in a 
foreign currency (European Central Bank and Brown, Peter and Wehrmüller (2009)). 
Yet, despite the prevalence of such lending there is little or no empirical work identifying 
the impact of domestic monetary conditions on the local supply of credit in the domestic versus 
the foreign currency, and equally important there is no work identifying the impact of monetary 
policy set by the relevant central bank abroad (that issues the foreign currency) on the local 
supply of credit (in the different currencies).1 Given the increased calls for tighter international 
monetary co-operation in the aftermath of the financial crisis this is a particularly acute policy 
issue for emerging economies.2 
This paper therefore takes the next necessary step in the empirical literature that identifies ‒ 
with micro-data ‒ the impact of monetary policy on the provision of credit. While the impact of 
monetary policy on the supply of credit in the economy has been widely analyzed (Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012)), recent 
research on the impact of the monetary policy rate on the composition of the supply of credit has 
so far focused on direct credit risk taken (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2014a) and 
                                                 
1
 Recent work investigates the determinants and effects of global liquidity at the aggregate level. Cerutti, Claessens 
and Ratnovski (2014) for example use country-to-country level data on cross-border bank flows to study the non-
price determinants of the cross-border supply of credit. They find that global liquidity is driven primarily by 
uncertainty (VIX), US monetary policy (term premia but not federal funds rate per se), and UK and Euro Area bank 
conditions (proxied by leverage and TED spreads). 
2
 For example, Financial Times, January 30, 2014, “India’s Raghuram Rajan hits out at uncoordinated global policy.” 
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references therein). In this paper we analyze the impact of monetary policy along currency 
denomination and we do so for both the domestic and the foreign monetary policies.3 
In particular, we test two key hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that a monetary expansion 
by the domestic central bank decreases the local banks’ cost of funding in the domestic currency 
but not (at least to the same extent) in the foreign currency, generating a differential impact on 
banks’ loan supply decisions in the different currencies. Second, we hypothesize that a monetary 
expansion by the foreign central bank lowers the domestic (but potentially foreign owned) banks’ 
cost of funding in the foreign currency but not in the domestic currency and examine, again, the 
local banks’ consequent lending decisions in the domestic and foreign currencies. 
Hungary provides an almost ideal setting to identify this currency compositional effect. 
Many local loans are denominated in Euro or in Swiss franc (in some sample years more than a 
third of the bank lending was), and the comprehensive credit register at the Central Bank of 
Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) contains granular information on all loans extended by all 
credit institutions operating in Hungary, including and ‒ essential for our purposes ‒ their 
currency denomination. And with an economic system dominated by banks, we can separate 
credit supply from demand by exploiting theoretically-motivated interactions between monetary 
conditions on the one hand and a key bank balance-sheet strength variable, i.e., the bank capital-
to-total-assets ratio, on the other (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Kashyap and Stein 
(2000)). The definition of the bank capital-to-total-assets ratio we employ closely follows the 
theoretical literature that attributes a prominent role to net worth in determining the ability of 
                                                 
3
 Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2014) assess if changes in the US federal funds rate have compositional effects on 
the supply of US dollar denominated credit granted in Bolivia, an almost entirely dollarized country. However they 
do not assess – as we do – the potencies of the bank lending channels in both the domestic and foreign currencies. 
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banks to obtain financing from their own financiers (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1998), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011)). 
As common in the literature, we account for the stance of monetary policy with a change in 
the three-month interest rate (Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003)). We further 
comprehensively account for changes in domestic GDP growth and inflation (Taylor (1993)), at 
all levels of interaction where the domestic interest rate is also featured. To achieve identification 
we further focus on the set of loans in various currencies granted in the same month to the same 
borrower by one or more banks of varying balance-sheet strengths (by including in the 
specifications firm-time fixed effects). Within this set of loans, for which the (observed and 
unobserved) quality of potential borrowers is constant, we study how monetary conditions affect 
the granting of loans in different currencies depending on bank capital. 
Given these ingredients we can identify the impact of the monetary conditions set by both 
domestic and foreign central banks on the supply of credit by local banks in both domestic and 
foreign currencies. We find that expansionary domestic monetary conditions substantially 
increase lending from banks with lower capital ratios in the domestic currency but not in the 
foreign currency. Expansionary foreign monetary conditions on the other hand spur lending in 
the foreign currency but not in the domestic currency. These estimated differences in potency of 
the bank lending channels in domestic and foreign currency are not only statistically significant 
but also economically relevant (as our detailed discussion in the paper demonstrates). So when 
credit is also granted in foreign currencies, domestic monetary policy drives only part of the local 
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supply of credit, and foreign monetary policies will also matter. In that case “multiple bank 
lending channels of various strengths may run through a country.”4 
Our paper relates to the large empirical literature on financial dollarization that studies the 
determinants of banks’ domestic lending in foreign currency in Latin American and transition 
economies (Nagy, Jeffrey and Zettelmeyer (2011)). This literature finds that in general the lack 
of macroeconomic policy credibility, inflation volatility, low institutional quality, interest rate 
differentials, financial market development, and foreign funding of bank credit all contribute to a 
high level of foreign currency bank loans in these economies (e.g., Barajas and Méndez Morales 
(2003), De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003), Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005), Rosenberg and Tirpák 
(2009), Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez and Jurgilas (2011)). In contrast to this literature that focuses on 
macro-level money, credit and output aggregates, and often highlights carry-trade on the demand 
side, we employ micro-level data to identify the impact of changes in monetary conditions on the 
supply of bank credit across currencies.5 
                                                 
4
 We are clearly not the first to assess the potency of a domestic bank lending channel in Central and Eastern Europe 
or to consider the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in the presence of financial dollarization. Matousek and 
Sarantis (2009) for example use bank-level data from eight countries in the region. They find evidence for the 
channel’s existence ‒ though with varying strength ‒ in each country. Actually the weakest evidence for the channel 
comes from Hungary: Only bank size and liquidity appear to play some role in marking the banks’ responses to 
changes in the monetary policy stance. Other recent work confirming the existence of a bank lending channel comes 
from individual countries, including again Hungary (Horváth, Krekó and Naszódi (2006)), the Czech Republic 
(Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007)), and Poland (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005)). Using credit aggregates from four Central 
and Eastern European economies Brzoza-Brzezina, Chmielewski and Niedźwiedzińska (2010) for example find that 
restrictive monetary policy may lead to a substitution in the demand for domestic to foreign currency loans, while 
using credit aggregates from Latvia and Serbia Beņkovskis (2008) and Kujundžić and Otašević (2012) show that 
interest rate changes may affect credit in the domestic currency but seem to have limited impact on credit granted in 
the foreign currency. Relatedly, Mora (2013) analyzes a sample of 56 banks in Mexico and documents that banks 
with a low amount of foreign currency deposits are more (less) sensitive to domestic (foreign) monetary policy 
shocks than banks with a substantial amount of foreign currency deposits. Complementing extant work, however, 
we identify the impact of monetary conditions at home and abroad on the supply of credit by individual banks to 
individual firms in local and foreign currencies, directly accounting for time-varying firm-level loan demand (at a 
monthly frequency). 
5
 Brown, Ongena and Yeşin (2011) analyze firm level data and document that foreign currency borrowing by small 
firms is related to (firm-level) foreign currency revenues suggesting that the macroeconomic and institutional 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes foreign currency lending 
in Hungary, the country’s credit register, and the resultant sample. Section III discusses the 
identification strategy. Section IV introduces the methodology and the variables. Section V 
contains the results assessing the potency of the bank lending channels in both domestic and 
foreign currency. Section VI concludes. 
II. Foreign Currency Lending in Hungary and Data Sources 
A. Foreign Currency Lending in Hungary 
Hungary’s transition from a centrally planned to a market economy started at the end of the 
1980s and was accompanied by a major inflow of foreign bank capital into the financial sector. 
By the end of the 1990s the majority of the banks in the country were foreign owned. Since 
capital markets were still underdeveloped, during the transition period, bank loans provided the 
major funding source for economic growth. 
In early 2000s, a credit expansion started fuelled by an intense competition in the banking 
sector. In parallel, the share of foreign currency denominated loans increased significantly both 
in the household and the corporate sector. While the most popular denominations were the Euro 
and the Swiss Franc (see Figures 1 and 2), other currencies like the US dollar and even the 
Japanese yen were also not uncommon for corporations. From 2004 onwards, with the 
disappearance of state-subsidized domestic currency mortgages, foreign currency loans became a 
major retail bank product. By the end of 2007, 56 percent of total outstanding loans to non-bank 
clients were denominated in foreign currency (Brown, Peter and Wehrmüller (2009)). 
                                                                                                                                                             
environment may not be the only determinant of financial dollarization. Consequently their paper suggests that firm-
level controls are essential to identify the effects of monetary conditions on bank lending in various currencies. 
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[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
On the supply side, the foreign ownership of banks and the intense competition in the 
banking sector both contributed significantly to the spread of foreign currency loans. On the 
demand side, the major reason for borrowing in a foreign currency was the lower interest rate 
accompanied by borrowers’ low awareness of exchange rate risks. 6  In particular large 
corporations with revenues in Euro started to borrow in Euro to hedge their exchange rate 
exposures. The popularity of Swiss Franc loans is attributed to even lower interest rates and low 
Euro/Swiss Franc exchange rate volatility during the period. When the financial crisis hit 
Hungary in the Fall of 2008, the Hungarian Forint depreciated significantly against the major 
currencies. In subsequent years, the share of foreign currency lending decreased, Swiss Franc 
lending essentially vanished, but lending in Euro preserved its importance both in the household 
and corporate sectors. 
B. The Hungarian Central Credit Information System (KHR) 
The Hungarian Central Credit Information System (KHR) contains information on all 
outstanding loans extended by all credit institutions operating in Hungary. As such this credit 
register contains loans from commercial banks, branch offices of foreign banks, saving 
cooperatives, credit unions, specialized credit institutions and other financial enterprises. We 
restrict our sample to loans granted by commercial banks and branch offices of foreign banks 
                                                 
6
 The prospect of the introduction of the Euro as the national currency may also have been a contributing factor to 
the assessment of the foreign exchange risks involved (Fidrmuc, Hake and Stix (2013)). 
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and focus on commercial and industrial loans that represent 66 percent of total loans registered in 
the credit register. 
We observe all outstanding loans denominated in the domestic as well as foreign currency, 
between 2005 and 2011, at a monthly frequency. We aggregate the data to the firm-month-
currency level which will be the focal unit of observation in our analysis. 
We match the thus-organized loan data to firm and bank characteristics. Firms’ financial 
statement data are available from the Hungarian National Tax and Custom Administration 
(APEH) database that contains the balance sheet and income statement of all Hungarian firms 
with double-entry book-keeping. Banks’ financial and ownership data are available from bank 
regulatory reports accessible at the Central Bank of Hungary. Because the credit register 
provides information only about the type of the lender (bank, branch office, savings cooperative, 
leasing company, or other type) but not the individual lender’s identity, we obtain information on 
the extant bank-firm relationships from a firm register called Complex that contains each firm’s 
bank account numbers. The first three digits of the bank account number (called GIRO code) 
uniquely identify the bank belonging to a particular account number. For the majority of firms, 
this information unambiguously identifies the lender since three quarters of the firms in our 
dataset borrow from one bank only. A quarter of the firms have multiple bank relationships (and 
2.36 banks on average). For these firms, we are not able to uniquely identify the bank-firm 
relationship. 
III. Identification Strategy 
Do low monetary policy rates at home and/or abroad spur changes in the currency 
denomination of the credit that is supplied by banks? To address this question one needs to 
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disentangle the impact of the changes in the interest rate on the currency denomination in the 
supply of credit from changes in the volume of the supply and changes in the quality and the 
volume of the demand ‒ while accounting for the impact of other key macro variables. This bank 
supply channel involves compositional changes in the supply of credit at the bank-firm-currency 
denomination level. 
Our identification strategy consists of two crucial ingredients: (1) Interacting the change in 
the interest rate with bank capital and currency denomination, while saturating with firm-time 
fixed effects; (2) horseracing the interest rate, in its interaction with bank capital and currency 
denomination, with the corresponding triple interactions of other key macro variables, in 
particular GDP growth and inflation. 
As we are assessing the within-firm credit composition (along currency), first-stage firm-
level loan application information as in Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011), Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró and Saurina (2012), Berg and Kirschenmann (2014) and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and 
Saurina (2014a), for example, would be potentially less informative for our purposes. Given that 
we focus on the currency denomination of credit granted to a firm in a certain month knowing 
the currency requested by the firm would be helpful. However, and as far as we are aware, no 
credit register in the world records this type of information (Miller (2003)) and only one study so 
far employs information on the currency requested from loan applications made to one bank 
(Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2013)). 
We now discuss the two aforementioned strategy components in more detail, along with our 
measures of credit granting. 
9 
 
A. Estimated Model 
Our benchmark specification is a model that explains the extensive margin of the granting of 
loans in a currency given the firm had no precedent loan in the currency before. We also 
investigate the ending of lending across currencies and the increase in the amount of different 
currency lending. 
1. Saturation with Fixed Effects and Triple Interactions 
a) Firm-Time Fixed Effects 
Given the prominent role of net worth in determining the borrowing by banks from their 
financiers, and given that the majority of banks may have little capital at stake, expansionary 
monetary policy by the central bank managing one currency may spur banks into lending in this 
respective currency but not necessarily (or at least not to an equal degree) in other currencies 
given imperfect hedging opportunities for either the bank and/or its financiers.7 
However, this testable prediction can also be consistent with demand channels, in particular 
with the firm balance sheet and the interest rate channels of monetary policy (Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995)). Therefore, to suppress concurrent changes in the type (along balance sheet 
strength or export opportunities, for example) and volume of the firm demand for credit, we 
saturate our benchmark specifications with firm-time fixed effects. Observed and unobserved 
time-varying firm characteristics that are accounted for in this way include the net present value 
of firm projects, export and investment opportunities, agency problems, risk, pledgeable income 
and collateral. Identification comes from comparing changes in lending by one or more banks 
(that are different with respect to their capital-to-asset ratios) in the same month to the same firm 
                                                 
7
 According to Hungarian regulation, banks’ reserve requirements do not differ for deposits in different currencies. 
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in different currencies. Only a quarter of the firms deal with multiple banks, so in robustness we 
break out the single-bank firms for which we know the exact bank – firm exposure. 
2. Triple Interaction of Interest Rate, Bank Capital Ratio, and Currency 
Denomination 
Given the set of fixed effects, identification of a bank lending channel comes from 
exploiting the testable prediction that when the monetary policy rate is lower for one particular 
currency, banks with lower net worth will lend more in this currency. Therefore, it is essential to 
have a sharp measure for the intensity of the agency conflict that besets banks’ own borrowing 
from their financiers. The bank capital-to-assets ratio is such a measure (Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997)). The ratio is also particularly meaningful in Hungary because off-balance sheet activity 
by banks has been almost non-existent.8 
To identify the “currency composition channel” of monetary policy we interact the change 
in the interest rate with the lagged bank capital ratio (in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein (2000)) 
and the currency of the bank-firm exposure. When explaining new credit granted or credit 
growth we expect a negative sign for the estimated coefficient on this triple interaction term: 
When the domestic interest rate decreases, banks with a lower capital ratio are less likely to grant 
more credit in the foreign currency for example. However if the different currencies are 
substitutable for banks (through e.g. hedging),9 this estimated coefficient should be close to zero, 
                                                 
8
 Banks in Hungary did not develop conduits or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). Total bank assets therefore 
cover most of the banks’ business. Securitization is also not practiced and therefore cannot be a significant motive 
for lending in the foreign currency. 
9
 Currencies are unlikely to be perfectly substitutable for all banks in our sample. Brown, Kirschenmann and 
Ongena (2013) for example examine how bank funding affects the currency denomination of business loans by 
analyzing information on the requested and granted loan currency for all loans granted by one Bulgarian bank. They 
document that foreign currency lending is at least partially driven by the bank’s eagerness to match the currency 
structure of assets with that of its liabilities. 
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while if lending in a foreign currency is perceived to facilitate extra risk taking the estimated 
coefficient may even be positive (or at least less negative).10 
As bank capital may be correlated with other bank characteristics, we also add in 
corresponding triple interactions (i.e., in which bank capital is featured) of various bank 
characteristics. In accordance with the focus of our analysis, we cluster standard errors at the 
firm level.11 
B. Horseracing Triple Interactions 
1. Interest Rate 
Banks are mostly funded by short-term debt, the interest rates of which will likely respond 
to changes in the monetary policy rate. As in Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003), we employ 
the yearly change in a three-month interest rate, for Hungarian Forint exposures on a Hungarian 
government bond, and for euro lending on a generic government bond. For Swiss Franc lending 
we use the annual change in the Swiss 3-month LIBOR interest rate.12 For all three interest rates 
our sample period spans a full yet (across-interest-rates) distinct cycle and corresponding 
changes in the foreign exchange rate (see Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
10
 In this case the bank`s lower net worth (or “skin in the game”) could lead to more foreign currency lending. 
Notice that in that case there could also be more risky lending in the domestic currency. 
11
 Banks may prefer to lend in a currency in which the firm has revenues for example (even though revenue currency 
denomination may not always be fully observable, potentially leading to more foreign currency credit as in Brown, 
Ongena and Yeşin (2014)). Due to the high frequency of most variables` series clustering at the firm and time (i.e., 
year-month) level robs all estimated coefficients of their statistical significance. Clustering at the main bank level (as 
in e.g. Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2014b)) throughout the analysis is impossible as we do not know the 
respective bank shares of the credit exposures. 
12
 We use a three-month interbank rate because there is no three-month Swiss Treasury bill or government bond. We 
rerun all key exercises with the relevant three-month interbank rate from the three currency areas but results are 
unaffected. 
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[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Assuaging concerns of reverse causality (e.g., future foreign currency lending by banks may 
imply current domestic monetary contraction) and omitted variables (variables correlated with 
the stance of monetary policy that can also influence bank lending) are the comprehensive sets of 
firm-time fixed effects which absorb any observed and unobserved time-varying heterogeneity 
across all included firms (comprising, for all practical purposes, the entire economy). For 
monetary conditions set in the euro area and Switzerland these concerns weigh considerably less. 
2. Other Key Macro Variables 
Despite the predominance of banks’ short-term funding, their lending could also be affected 
by other key macro variables. Hence, the third crucial component in our identification strategy is 
to concurrently account for the effects of changes in GDP growth and prices as the main 
determinants of the monetary policy rate (but which may also capture firm investment 
opportunities and pledgeable income) and other aggregate variables including changes in 
exchange rate and foreign direct investment. We therefore horserace the triple interaction of 
changes in GDP growth, prices and other macro variables, with bank capital and currency 
denomination, with the equivalent triple interactions with the monetary policy rate. 
Given their correlation with the interest rate, these macro variables in triples also feature as 
controls, to the extent that the firm-time fixed effects did not already soak up relevant 
macroeconomic variation. 
Given our comprehensive data, sample period, identification strategy, and saturated 
specifications, we are confident that it is possible to make well-founded inferences on whether 
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short-term monetary policy rates affect banks’ lending in different currencies, and in general on 
whether macroeconomic shocks result in changes in the composition of the supply of credit. 
IV. Methodology and Variables 
A. Model Line-Up 
This Section presents and discusses our estimates. We estimate models with as dependent 
variables new credit granted (extensive margin), and also ending credit (extensive margin) and 
increase in the credit amount granted (intensive margin). To stepwise saturate with fixed effects 
and make robust inferences, we employ linear probability models.13 
The sample period goes from January 2005 to December 2011. The total number of 
observations (i.e., total firm – credit in currency – year:month) equals 43,724,229, but given 
computing constraints the regressions in Tables II to VII employ a 10 percent random sample. 
Table I presents the summary statistics. Summary statistics for banks (firms) are based on the 
average values of the bank (firm) characteristics over the sample period. The number of banks in 
our sample is 39. The number of firms in our sample is 318,411. 
B. Specification and Dependent Variables 
The complete model before saturation with firm-time fixed effects, which is e.g., Model (5) 
in Table II, equals (in abridged form): 
 
                                                 
13
 Given the extensive sets of fixed effects we include and as we are primarily interested in the estimated 
coefficients on the triple interactions (as the next sections explain), we employ linear probability models (Ai and 
Norton (2003); Norton, Wang and Ai (2004)). 
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(1)                                                        γ                   
                                          
 
The dependent variable is a measure of the CREDITikt granted to firm i in currency k in 
month t. For each firm we know the set of banks the firm is having an account with but do not 
know the individual bank-firm credit exposure, except when the firm maintains only one bank 
which (“fortunately” in a sense) happens 74 percent of the time. 
We first focus on the extensive margin of new credit, i.e., New Granting of Credit, which 
equals one if firm i receives credit in currency k in month t, conditional on having no debt in 
currency k in month t-1, and equals zero otherwise. Later we assess the ending of credit and 
growth in amount with two additional dependent variables: Ending Credit which equals one if 
firm i receives no more credit in currency k in month t, conditional on having received some 
credit in currency k in month t-1, and equals zero otherwise; and Increasing the Amount of 
Credit which equals one if the nominal amount of credit firm i holds in currency k in month t 
exceeds the nominal amount of credit in currency k in month t-1, and equals zero otherwise.14 
The main independent variables are IN FXikt, the abridged label for Credit Is Granted in 
Foreign Currency, which equals one if the credit to firm i in month t is in currency k which is a 
foreign currency, and equals zero otherwise, ΔINTEREST RATEt-1 is the annual change in the 
                                                 
14
 Analyzing the extensive margin of new credit (in a binary manner) has many advantages. Such an analysis is 
comprehensive, comparable and directly interpretable across all loan types and conditions, it avoids having to adjust 
for exchange rate changes (which could create spurious correlations in our estimations), and it is least affected by 
the continuous decrease in firm-bank exposures according to their contracted repayment schedules. We will 
therefore also investigate in robustness the extensive margin of ending credit and the intensive margin of increasing 
credit in a binary manner. 
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relevant three month interest rate at t-1,15 and BANK CAPITALbt-1 is the capital ratio at time t-1 
defined as the ratio of bank equity and retained earnings over total assets of the set of banks b 
granting the credit. These latter two variables are discussed more at length in the next section. 
We are interested in the three coefficients, i.e., , δ and , the coefficients on currency 
denomination and its double and triple interactions with the interest rate, and the interest rate and 
bank capital. The specification further loads in firm- and time fixed effects (represented by i 
and t), and as controls include the following sets of variables: (1) the triple interactions of the 
change in GDP and inflation, respectively, with bank capital, and currency denomination; (2) 
bank capital ratio, size, liquidity, profitability and non-performing loans; (3) firm capital ratio, 
size, liquidity, profitability and expected sales ratio and (4) in specifications with no time fixed 
effects the changes in the exchange rate, foreign direct investment, sovereign credit default swap 
spread and yield curve. 
C. Main Independent Variables 
1. Short-Term Interest Rate 
The main variable of interest in our analysis is the yearly change in the three-month Forint 
interest rate that we measure by the yield on the three-month Hungarian government bond rate. 
The average change in the three-month interest rate during the sample period is -0.73 percentage 
points and it varies between -5.29 percentage points and 4.25 percentage points. To proxy for 
monetary policies from the other central banks that issue the currencies that are employed often, 
we also use the yearly change in three-month interest rates from the Eurozone and Switzerland. 
                                                 
15
 We also run specifications replacing the one-month lag of the interest rate with its two-, three-, four-, five-, or six-
month lags. Results are similar. 
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The Euro interest rate is based on the average yield on the three-month Euro benchmark 
government bonds while the Swiss interest rate is the three-month Swiss interbank rate. The 
average Euro and Swiss three-month interest rates in the sample period are -0.19 percentage 
points and -0.05 percentage points, respectively. The former varies between -3.91 percentage 
points and 1.25 percentage points, the latter between -2.73 percentage points and 1.19 percentage 
points. Definitions and summary statistics of all variables are in Table I. 
 
[Insert Table I here] 
 
To comprehensively account for changes in domestic GDP growth and inflation (Taylor 
(1993)), we include both variables at all levels of interaction where the domestic interest rate is 
also featured.16 The average GDP growth rate in Hungary during the sample period was 0.80 
percent ranging between -8.00 percent and 4.70 percent, while average inflation was -0.40 
percent, ranging between -1.05 and 6.73 percent. Additional macro controls are the annual 
change in the nominal effective exchange rate index of the Forint, foreign direct investment 
captured by the annual change in the amount of currency reserves at the Central Bank of 
Hungary, the annual change in the CDS rate on 5 year Hungarian sovereign bonds, and the 
annual change in the difference between 10-year and 1-year government bond yields. The macro 
variables are available monthly, except for GDP growth and currency reserves, which are 
                                                 
16
 Alternatively we run the interest rate first on GDP growth and inflation and employ the residuals of this regression 
rather than the interest rate itself. Results are very similar (and obviously independent of whether we then also 
feature in the second step GDP growth and inflation as independent variables). These results hold for both three-
month government bond and interbank interest rates. 
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measured quarterly. For interim months, we use the end-of-quarter GDP growth rate and 
currency reserve values. 
2. Bank Capital Ratio 
Our key bank balance-sheet variable is the Bank Capital Ratio defined as the ratio of bank 
equity over total assets. The average bank capital ratio during the sample period is 12.76 
percent.17 
We include as control variables a number of bank characteristics that capture the time-
variation in banks’ loan supply.18 In particular, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (Bank 
Total Assets) to proxy for bank size and the ratio of liquid to total assets (Bank Liquidity Ratio) 
to measure bank liquidity. We also include the Bank Return on Assets to measure profitability 
and the Bank Doubtful Loan Ratio to proxy for the current non-performance and riskiness of the 
bank’s portfolio. We note that the firm fixed effects we include also control for the average time-
invariant characteristics of the banks the firms maintain. 
All bank balance-sheet and income statement variables are available at the monthly 
frequency. Balance-sheet variables for month t are proxied by their values at the end of month t-
1, while bank performance variables for month t are the annualized values of their values 
measured over month t-1. 
                                                 
17
 For a few branch offices of foreign banks, the bank capital ratio takes negative values. In our final sample, 
observations with negative bank-capital ratio represent less than 0.03 percent of the total number of observations, 
and removing these few observations does not alter our main findings. 
18
 Our data does not allow us to identify the individual bank-firm exposures when firms maintain multiple banks. 
Multiplicity occurs in around a quarter of the observations. We then simply average bank characteristics across the 
firms’ banks. 
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D. Control Variables Including Fixed Effects 
To control for the variation in the amount and quality of loan demand faced by the banks, 
we also include a set of firm characteristics, as well as firm and firm-time fixed effects in our 
specifications (with time equal to year:month). In particular, in all regressions without firm-time 
fixed effects, we include the Firm Capital Ratio measured by the ratio of the firm’s equity 
capital to total assets, the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (Firm Total Assets), the 
Firm Liquidity Ratio measured by the ratio of current to the total assets, the Firm Return On 
Assets that equals to the firm’s net income over total assets, as control variables. To capture 
foreign linkages, we also use the Firm Export Sales Ratio calculated as the ratio of export sales 
over total sales. 
Firm characteristics are available at yearly frequency. For each month in a given year, our 
firm-level balance-sheet variables are proxied by their values taken at the end of the preceding 
year, while income statement variables are proxied by their values measured over year t-1. 
V. Results 
A. Effect of Domestic Monetary Policy on the Composition of Loan Supply 
1. Domestic versus Foreign Currency Credit 
We start analysing the effect of domestic monetary policy on banks’ loan supply decisions 
focusing on domestic vis-à-vis foreign currency loans, without distinguishing between firms’ 
exposures in Euro and Swiss Franc. We focus on the extensive margin of lending by examining 
the effect of monetary policy on changes in the likelihood of banks’ first-time credit granting in a 
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certain currency (i.e., the extensive margin of new credit, henceforth abridged as “credit 
initiation”). 
Table II presents our first results. Models 1 to 4 provide a step-by-step development towards 
the base specification which is Model 4 and which includes all relevant interaction terms for the 
interest rate, GDP growth, and inflation. The estimated coefficients of the domestic interest rate 
variable are highly significant in all models and have the expected negative sign suggesting that 
an interest rate decrease expands credit. In addition, Model 2 shows that the coefficient of the 
interaction of the interest rate with the bank capital ratio is statistically significant and takes a 
positive sign implying that a lower interest rate boosts credit granting especially by banks with 
low capital-to-asset ratios. This estimate is consistent with the existence of a bank-lending 
channel in Hungary, similar to the U.S. (e.g. Kashyap and Stein (2000)) and Spain (Jiménez, 
Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012)). 
The bottom panel in Table 2 presents the economic relevance of the estimated coefficients. 
A 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest rate increases the likelihood of initiating credit 
by a lowly capitalized bank 0.019 percentage point more than for a highly capitalized bank (if we 
take the difference between low and high capitalization to be equal to two standard deviations of 
the sample capitalization ratio). The estimated effect is thus economically significant, taking into 
account that the sample probability of new credit for any firm is 0.23 percent implying a semi-
elasticity of the difference in loan granting between lowly and highly capitalized banks of 8 
percent. 
 
[Insert Table II here] 
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We next study the compositional effect of monetary policy on banks’ loan supply decisions 
in Models 4 to 7. The estimates in Model 4 show that the differential impact of an interest rate 
change between lowly and highly capitalized banks is magnified when lending occurs in the 
domestic currency and minimized when lending occurs in a foreign currency. The same result is 
obtained in Model 5, which includes time – i.e., year:month – fixed effects, in addition to the 
firm fixed effects that were present in Models 1 to 4. Model 4 shows that a 25 basis point 
decrease in the domestic interest rate generates a 0.029 percentage point higher likelihood of 
credit initiation by a lowly- than by a highly capitalized bank when credit is granted in the 
domestic currency (Hungarian Forint). This differential impact represents 13 percent of the 
probability of credit initiation in the sample and is thus economically relevant. Model 5 indicates 
that the estimated economic effect is even higher – 14 percent of the sample probability of 
granting first-time credit – when, besides firm fixed effects, we also include time fixed effects in 
the regression. Coefficients on triple interaction terms including the interest rate variable in 
Models 4 and 5 show, however, that when lending takes place in a foreign currency, the 
economic impact of bank capitalization on the likelihood of first-time credit granting is almost 
insignificant. According to Model 4 (Model 5), a 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest 
rate generates a differential impact between low and high capitalization banks that equals only 4 
percent (5 percent) of the unconditional probability of initiating credit in the sample. 
Models 6 and 7 saturate the empirical specification with firm-time fixed effects that account 
for all time-varying firm-specific heterogeneity in loan demand (volume and quality). The 
estimated coefficients on the triple interactions of the interest rate, bank capitalization, and 
currency denomination, indicate that the differential impact of interest rate changes along 
capitalization on credit initiation in domestic and foreign currency is robust to accounting for all 
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time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand. The bottom panel in Table II shows that the 
size of the difference in the economic impact between the domestic and foreign currencies equals 
8 and 4 percent, respectively. The two models differ in the sample employed: Model 7 restricts 
the sample to firms with only one bank relationship (making the bank singularly identifiable), 
which represent 74 percent of all firms in our sample. Model 7 reveals that our results on the 
currency compositional effect of monetary policy are robust to the restriction of our analysis to 
one-bank firms. 
Concerning the effects of other key macro variables, Table II confirms the economic 
relevance of GDP growth and CPI inflation in banks’ loan supply decisions. Model 1 shows that 
both GDP growth and inflation have negligible aggregate effect on credit granting. Model 2, 
however, indicates that there is heterogeneity in how banks respond to changes in these 
macroeconomic variables. High GDP growth and low inflation boost credit granting by lowly 
capitalized banks, while reduce lending by highly capitalized banks. This finding corresponds to 
results in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012) suggesting that GDP growth increases 
the probability of loan granting by Spanish banks. Estimates on the triple interactions of the GDP 
growth or inflation variables, bank capital, and the foreign currency dummy in Model 4 suggest 
that the differential impacts of changes in GDP growth and inflation between lowly and highly 
capitalized banks are magnified when lending occurs in the domestic currency and minimized 
when lending occurs in a foreign currency. Models 5 to 7 show that these results are robust to the 
inclusion of time fixed effects or firm-time fixed effects. 
Overall, the results of Models 4 to 7 suggest that there is also a compositional effect in 
banks’ loan supply decisions when responding to a change in the domestic interest rate: 
Expansionary monetary policy increases the likelihood of credit initiation in the domestic 
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currency but banks’ foreign currency lending is essentially unaffected. Put differently, the bank 
lending channel of the domestic monetary policy loses its potency when it comes to the supply of 
credit in the foreign currency. 
2. Robustness: Other Macroeconomic and Bank Characteristics and Sample 
Splits 
In this robustness section we first examine whether, besides GDP growth and inflation, 
banks’ loan supply decisions are sensitive to shocks in other macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, we horserace triple interactions of bank capital, currency denomination, and various 
macroeconomic variables, including, besides GDP growth and inflation, the nominal effective 
exchange rate and the amount of foreign direct investment in the country. 
The estimates in Models 1 and 2 in Table III suggest that neither changes in the exchange 
rate nor changes in foreign direct investment affect the currency composition of credit granting.19 
Inclusion of triple interactions of the two macro variables with bank capital and currency 
denomination does not alter our findings regarding the differential supply effects of monetary 
policy. The difference in the economic impact between the domestic and foreign currencies is 13 
and 5 percent, similar in magnitude to the differential impact obtained in our baseline 
specifications (see Models 6 and 7 in Table II). 
To test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the macroeconomic shock variable, in 
unreported regressions we also include either one of two regulatory dummies. The first dummy 
equals one after 2008:01, the introduction of Basle II, and equals zero before. The second 
                                                 
19
 To conserve space in Table III we focus on firms’ aggregate foreign currency exposures without distinguishing 
between Euro and Swiss Franc loans (as we will do in the next section) and we present only the most saturated 
specification that includes firm-time fixed effects. Results are unaffected when splitting up by currency as the next 
section will show. To conserve space we henceforth also only report the estimated semi-elasticities. 
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dummy equals one after 2008:09, when Swiss francs lending by banks to households was no 
longer allowed, and equals zero before. These dummies are introduced at all levels, including the 
triple interactions with bank capital and the currency of exposure.  But results on the triple 
interactions with the interest rate are unaffected in both cases. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 
So far we have focused on bank equity to total bank assets as the only bank balance-sheet 
characteristic that may affect changes in banks’ lending decisions following monetary shocks 
(Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)). We now alter the measurement of bank capital  and also follow 
the previous literature by examining whether bank size (the natural logarithm of bank assets) and 
bank liquidity (the ratio of liquid to total bank assets) also affect the impact of interest rate 
changes on banks’ loan supply. Furthermore, we examine whether bank foreign ownership 
matters. 
In Models 3 and 4 we employ as an alternative to the Bank Capital Ratio the (one-month 
lagged) Bank Regulatory Capital Ratio which is defined as regulatory capital over risk-weighted 
assets. The reasons for this replacement are twofold. First, bank capital is the outcome of 
strategic choices made by the bank, and even when pre-determined in time endogeneity concerns 
may linger. Regulatory capital suffers (somewhat less) on this account. Second, Popov and Udell 
(2012) for example document that especially regulatory capital constraints determine bank 
lending. Our results remain robust however to the choice of bank capital measure. Alternatively 
in further unreported regressions we also instrument the Bank Capital Ratio with for example 
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one and two-quarter lags of the Bank Regulatory Capital Ratio (and/or lags of the bank capital 
ratio itself). Again results are very similar. 
In Models 5 and 6 we follow Kashyap and Stein (1995) and focus on the impact of monetary 
shocks on the supply of loans by banks of different size, measuring bank size by total assets. The 
estimated coefficients of triple interactions of the interest rate change, bank size, and currency 
denomination are all insignificant suggesting that following monetary shocks there is no 
currency compositional effect in the supply of loans identifiable from the adjustment of banks of 
different size. In Models 7 and 8 we add the Bank Capital Ratio and its interactions and observe 
that the estimated coefficient on the triple interaction term that includes the bank capital ratio is 
statistically significant and economically large, while the triple term that includes Bank Total 
Assets is at best marginally significant and is always economically very small. 
In Models 9 and 10, inspired by Kashyap and Stein (2000)) or Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and 
Saurina (2012), we examine the impact of monetary shocks on the supply of credit by banks with 
different liquidity ratios. The estimates suggest a differential impact of interest rate changes 
along the bank liquidity characteristic. Estimates of Model 9, for example, indicate that when 
credit is granted in the domestic currency a 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest rate 
generates a 5 percent larger difference in the impact on the likelihood of credit granting between 
banks with low and high liquidity ratios, than when credit is granted in the foreign currency. In 
Models 11 and 12 we horserace the bank capital ratio with liquidity. The estimates indicate it is 
especially the bank capital ratio that drives adjustments in banks’ loan supply decisions 
following monetary changes. 
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Because foreign ownership may affect banks’ own funding across currencies differentially 
we horse race the bank capital ratio with foreign ownership in Models 13 and 14.20 The estimated 
coefficients on foreign ownership are not statistically significant while the estimated coefficients 
on the triple interaction term with bank capital ratio again imply that when credit is granted in 
the domestic currency, a 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest rate generates a 7 and 5 
percent larger difference, respectively, in the impact on the likelihood of credit granting between 
banks with low and high capital ratios, than when credit is granted in a foreign currency.21 In 
Model 1 in Table IV we further split the sample by foreign ownership of banks and find similar 
estimated coefficients on these triple interactions of interest. 
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 
Next we study the period before and after the filing for bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers in 
2008:09, which is now commonly considered as the start of the most acute phase of the global 
financial crisis that eventually also spread to Hungary. Models 3 and 4 contain the estimated 
coefficients from the period before Lehman. The difference in potency between the lending 
channels in domestic and foreign currency is larger than for the entire period. For the short 
                                                 
20
 Another issue may arise if foreign owned banks have more foreign currency-denominated liabilities on their 
balance sheets. A decrease in the Forint interest rate may then affect their capital-to-assets ratio through its effect on 
the exchange rate with the Forint. The Forint depreciation will increase the Forint equivalent of the value of foreign 
currency denominated liabilities on the banks’ balance sheets and may concurrently decrease the capital-to-assets 
ratios of these banks. However all our specifications employ a one-month lagged capital ratio and in previous 
models this ratio was replaced or instrumented with one- and two- quarter lags of the regulatory capital ratio. In 
general foreign banks may follow a different business model (e.g., Giannetti and Ongena (2009), Gormley (2010), 
Beck, Ioannidou and Schäfer (2012), Giannetti and Ongena (2012)) than domestic banks which may change their 
sensitivity to changes in monetary conditions (see similarly Zaheer, Ongena and van Wijnbergen (2013) on Islamic 
banks and Morck, Yavuz and Yeung (2013) on state-owned banks). 
21
 The estimated coefficients on foreign ownership are also not statistically significant when the bank capital ratio is 
not included. 
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period after Lehman none of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant (further 
unreported).22 
Finally, in Models 5 and 6 in Table IV we focus our analysis on the 50 percent largest firms 
by total assets (the 50 largest percent by number of employees yields similar results). We are 
interested if the economic relevancy of the difference in potency between the two channels also 
pertains to these large firms.23 It does, making the observed phenomenon also relevant in an 
aggregate sense. 
3. Domestic versus Euro and Swiss Franc Credit 
We continue analysing the effect of domestic monetary policy on banks’ loan supply 
decisions now distinguishing between Euro and Swiss Franc loans. Again, we focus on the 
extensive margin of lending and analyse banks’ first-time credit granting decisions. 
Table V presents our estimates. Models 1 to 7 in Table V are equivalent to the similarly 
numbered models in Table II, except that in the specifications of Table V, the dummy variable 
“Credit is Granted in Foreign Currency” is decomposed into two distinctive dummy variables, 
“Credit is granted in Euro” and “Credit is granted in Swiss Franc”. This decomposition allows 
us to investigate whether the impact of monetary policy on the supply of credit depends on a 
specific foreign currency denomination or not. 
                                                 
22
 There are a number of potential explanations for this lack of statistical significance: (1) Banks may have 
substantially changed their lending policies if not voluntarily (e.g., Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), de Haas and van 
Lelyveld (2014)) then various regulatory limits may have become binding (Rosenberg and Tirpák (2009)); (2) due to 
unconventional monetary policies changes in short-term interest rates may have become less representative of 
changes in monetary conditions; and/or (3) the subsample period may be simply too short to yield statistically 
significant estimates. 
23
 We also assess results across EU and various other firm-size categorization schemes. Results are similar except 
for some largest-size classes. However, given the continuous financing needs of the largest firms, changes on their 
extensive margins of borrowing are also less frequent (potentially leading to less statistical significance). Notice that 
some small business owners in Hungary are thought to have personal bank accounts in Switzerland or the Euro area, 
making their (for us un-observable) personal financial situation potentially an omitted variable. We expect this effect 
to play less of a role for large firms. 
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[Insert Table V here] 
 
The results confirm the evidence presented in Table II. The estimates of Model 2 in Table V 
for example again imply that a 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest rate generates a 
statistically significant and an economically relevant difference (of 8 percent) between lowly and 
highly capitalized banks in the likelihood of initiating credit, confirming our earlier evidence of 
the existence of a domestic bank-lending channel. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of Models 4 to 7 again indicate that an interest rate decrease 
affects credit initiation by banks to a greater extent when credit is granted in the domestic 
currency than when lending occurs in Euro or Swiss Franc. According to Model 5 that 
incorporates both firm and time fixed effects, a 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest 
rate results in a 0.03 percentage points higher likelihood of credit initiation by lowly than by 
highly capitalized banks when credit is granted in the domestic currency. The economic impact 
accounts for 19 percent of unconditional probability of credit initiation in the sample. When 
credit is granted in Euro or Swiss Franc, the equivalent differential effects are 4 and 5 percent, 
respectively, again suggesting a difference in the impact of domestic monetary policy on bank 
lending in the domestic and foreign currencies, but not between the two foreign currencies 
considered. The magnitudes of the estimated differential effects implied by the coefficients of 
Models 6 and 7, presented in the bottom panel of Table V, confirm this conjecture. Overall, 
Models 4 to 7 in Table V confirm our evidence of a currency compositional effect of domestic 
monetary policy on bank loan supply for this extensive margin of lending. 
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4. Further Robustness: Other Margins of Lending 
So far we have focused on the positive extensive margin of lending by analysing banks’ 
first-time credit granting decisions. To check our results concerning the compositional effects of 
monetary policy on banks’ loan supply decisions, in this section, we consider other margins of 
lending. In particular, we consider the likelihood of banks’ ending credit (negative extensive 
margin) and the likelihood of banks’ increasing credit (intensive margin) in the domestic and 
foreign currencies. 
 
[Insert Table VI here] 
 
The regressions of Models 1 to 4 in Table VI focus on the impact of monetary policy on 
banks’ decisions to end credit to borrowing firms. In Model 1, we include firm fixed effects in 
the regressions to control for firm heterogeneity in loan demand. Model 2 incorporates both firm 
and time fixed effects, while Model 3 and 4 represents our most saturated specification which 
includes firm-time (year:month) fixed effects. The sign of the triple interactions of the variables 
Interest Rate Change, Bank Capital Ratio, and Credit is Granted in Euro (or Credit is Granted in 
Swiss Franc) shows that the currency compositional supply effect is present along the negative 
extensive margin as well. A domestic monetary expansion decreases the likelihood of banks’ 
ending credit, but only when credit is granted in the local currency (Hungarian Forint). The 
economic significance of the impact of monetary expansion on ending credit in Euro or Swiss 
Franc is negligible, as shown by the numbers at the bottom of Table VI. These estimates overall 
provide evidence for the presence of a compositional effect along this particular extensive 
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margin although the effect is statistically weaker (maybe because banks dither to cut firms off 
credit). 
Models 5 to 8 in Table VI examine the impact of monetary conditions on the likelihood of 
banks’ increasing the amount of credit to their borrowers. We find a strong compositional effect 
of monetary policy on bank loan supply along this intensive margin of lending as well. 
According to Model 6, when credit is granted in Hungarian Forint following a 25 basis point 
decrease in the domestic interest rate the difference in the response between banks with low and 
high capital ratios is 9 percent of the unconditional probability of increasing credit amount. In 
contrast, when credit is granted in Euro or Swiss Franc this differential impact does not exceed 1 
or 2 percent, respectively, of the unconditional probability of increasing credit amount in the 
sample. The strong significance of the triple interaction terms in Models 7 and 8 indicates that 
this compositional effect is robust to saturation with firm-time fixed effects. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that, besides affecting banks’ first-time credit granting 
decisions, monetary policy has an impact on the currency composition of loan supply along the 
negative extensive margin and the (positive) intensive margin as well. 
B. Compositional Effect of Domestic versus Foreign Monetary Policy 
Besides analysing the effect of domestic monetary policy on banks’ local lending decisions 
in the domestic and foreign currencies, we also consider the effects of monetary policy set by the 
central banks abroad issuing the foreign currency. Hence, in Table VII we extend our basic 
specification by including the annual change in the Euro and Swiss Franc interest rates as well as 
the corresponding interactions between interest rates, bank capitalization, and currency 
denomination. Among the macroeconomic variables the change in the nominal effective 
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exchange rate, i.e., Δ Exchange Rate, is replaced by two exchange rates, i.e., Δ Exchange Rate 
Hungarian Forint to Euro and Δ Exchange Rate Hungarian Forint to CHF. 
Models 1 to 4 in Table VII again differ in the manner we control for firm-level 
heterogeneity in credit demand. Model 1 includes only firm fixed effects. Model 2 accounts for 
both firm and time fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 control for time-varying heterogeneity in the 
demand by the use of the firm-month fixed effects and represent our most saturated 
specifications. 
 
[Insert Table VII here] 
 
We present several results concerning the impact of monetary policy on bank loan supply 
along the extensive margin of lending. First, our earlier findings concerning the effect of 
domestic monetary policy on the composition of domestic loan supply are confirmed by all 
models.24 A 25 basis point decrease in the domestic interest rate brings about a 0.032 to 0.035 
percentage point higher likelihood in credit initiation for lowly than for highly capitalized banks, 
indicating a semi-elasticity of 20 to 22 percent, when the loan is granted in the domestic currency 
(Forint). The estimated semi-elasticities of credit initiation in Euro and Swiss Franc – as 
suggested by Model 2 – are 4 and 5 percent, respectively. Overall, the results confirm the 
existence of differential supply effects across the three currencies: Domestic monetary expansion 
                                                 
24
 The mandate of the Central Bank of Hungary is to target domestic inflation and its policy could have reacted to 
interest rates set by other relevant central banks. By including changes in Euro and Swiss interest rates we in effect 
also account for these additional elements that may be present in an open economy monetary policy rule. However 
our findings suggest that at least with respect to the transmission through bank lending, foreign interest rates do not 
play a significant role in the observed policy reaction function. We think it is also rather unlikely that the European 
Central Bank or the Swiss National Bank would react directly to policy rate changes in Hungary. 
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positively affects credit supply in Hungarian Forint, but has a negligible effect on the supply of 
credit in Euro and Swiss Franc. 
Second, we present evidence that monetary changes in Switzerland influence the currency 
composition of the local supply of credit in Hungary. In all models of Table VII, the significance 
of the coefficients on the triple interaction of the variables Interest Rate Change in Switzerland, 
Bank Capital Ratio, and Credit is Granted in Euro (or Credit is Granted in Swiss Franc) indicate 
that changes in the Swiss interest rate have differential effects on the local supply of credit in the 
three different currencies. According to Model 2, when credit is granted in the domestic currency 
(Forint), a 25 basis point decrease in the Swiss interest rate results in a 0.216 percentage points 
lower likelihood of first-time credit granting by lowly than by highly capitalized banks.25 This 
differential effect represents 136 percent of the unconditional probability of granting first time 
credit in the sample (0.16 percent). In contrast, when credit is granted in Euro or Swiss Franc, the 
difference in impact of a 25 basis point change in the Swiss interest rate between lowly and 
highly capitalized banks are -0.017 and -0.044 percentage points, respectively. The economic 
effects, for the two currencies, therefore amount to -11 and -28 percent of the likelihood of 
granting first-time credit in the sample. Consequently, a monetary expansion in Switzerland 
causes a relative contraction in credit supply in Forint but a relative expansion in the supply of 
Euro and especially Swiss Franc credit. This suggests that for the local supply of credit not only 
the domestic monetary policy matters, but also the monetary policy set by the central bank 
abroad that issues the foreign currency. 
                                                 
25
 For ease of comparison we use a 25 basis points change for all three interest rates. However, the standard 
deviation on the Euro and Swiss interest rates equal only 13 and 10 basis points, respectively. 
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Finally, we examine the effect of monetary policy in the Euro area on the local supply of 
credit in Hungary by including the Euro area interest rate with its relevant interaction terms in 
the regressions. The estimated coefficients of the triple interaction of the variables Interest Rate 
Change in the Euro Area, Bank Capital Ratio, and Credit is Granted in Euro (or Credit is 
Granted in Swiss Franc), are insignificant in all models suggesting that the effect of monetary 
policy in the Eurozone on local credit supply in Hungary does not vary by the currency 
denomination of the loans. This insignificance may arise from the fact that markets may at some 
point have expected the Forint to converge with the Euro over time and that therefore especially 
the longer maturity loans granted in Euros would be eventually be serviced in the new future 
domestic currency. We conclude that the impact of a monetary expansion in the Eurozone is 
therefore not fully identifiable in our sample. In contrast, the causal impact of a change in Swiss 
monetary conditions on the composition of domestic loan supply is clear and present. 
VI. Conclusion 
We analyze the differential impact of domestic and foreign monetary policy on the local 
supply of bank credit in domestic and foreign currencies. We analyze a novel, supervisory 
dataset from Hungary that records all bank lending to firms including its currency denomination. 
This paper therefore takes the next obvious step in the empirical literature that identifies ‒ with 
micro-data ‒ the impact of monetary policy on the provision of credit. 
Accounting for time-varying firm-specific heterogeneity in loan demand, we find that a 
lower domestic interest rate expands the supply of credit in the domestic but not in the foreign 
currency. A lower foreign interest rate on the other hand expands lending by lowly versus highly 
capitalized banks relatively more in the foreign than in the domestic currency. 
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The implications of our findings for monetary policy making are straightforward but salient. 
Local bank lending in foreign currencies limits the flow of the transmission of domestic 
monetary policy through a bank lending channel in the domestic currency only. Lending in 
foreign currencies is seemingly mostly unaffected by domestic monetary policy. On the other 
hand, monetary policies pursued by central banks abroad may affect local bank lending in these 
foreign currencies.  
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Figure 3. Interest Rates and Effective Exchange Rates in Hungarian Forint (HUF), Euro (EUR) 
and Swiss Francs (CHF)
EUR Interbank Rate HUF Interbank Rate CHF Interbank Rate Effective Exchange Rate
Variable Units Definition Mean Std Min Median Max
Dependent variables
Euro and Swiss Franc Exposures Aggregated
New Granting of Creditikt 0/1 =1 if firm i receives credit in currency k in month t, conditional on
having received no credit in currency k in month t‐1, =0
otherwise
0.0023 0.0481 0 0 1
Ending Creditikt 0/1 =1 if firm i receives no more credit in currency k in month t,
conditional on having received some credit in currency k in
month t‐1, =0 otherwise
0.0018 0.0422 0 0 1
Increasing the Amount of Creditikt 0/1 =1 if the nominal amount of credit firm i holds in currency k in
month t exceeds the nominal amount of credit in currency k in
month t‐1, =0 otherwise
0.0076 0.0871 0 0 1
Euro and Swiss Franc Exposures Disaggregated
New Granting of Creditikt 0/1 =1 if firm i receives credit in currency k in month t, conditional on
having received no credit in currency k in month t‐1, =0
otherwise
0.0016 0.0399 0 0 1
Ending Creditikt 0/1 =1 if firm i receives no more credit in currency k in month t,
conditional on having received some credit in currency k in
month t‐1, =0 otherwise
0.0012 0.0351 0 0 1
Increasing the Amount of Creditikt 0/1 =1 if the nominal amount of credit firm i holds in currency k in
month t exceeds the nominal amount of credit in currency k in
month t‐1, =0 otherwise
0.0051 0.0713 0 0 1
Independent variables
Macroeconomic variables
 Interest Ratet‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Hungarian 3‐month government bond rate ‐0.007 0.024 ‐0.053 0.001 0.043
 Interest Rate in Euro Areat‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Euro area 3‐month generic government
bond rate
‐0.002 0.013 ‐0.039 0.001 0.013
 Interest Rate in Switzerlandt‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Swiss 3‐month LIBOR interest rate 0.000 0.010 ‐0.027 0.001 0.012
 Interbank Interest Ratet‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Hungarian 3‐month interbank rate ‐0.008 0.024 ‐0.051 ‐0.002 0.041
 Interbank Interest Rate in Euro Areat‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Euro area 3‐month interbank rate ‐0.001 0.015 ‐0.044 0.004 0.014
Δ Taylor Rule Residuals Government Bondst‐ ‐ Annual change in the residuals of a regression of the Hungarian 3‐
month government bond rate on GDP growth and the infl aƟon
rate
‐0.006 0.024 ‐0.060 ‐0.005 0.055
Δ Taylor Rule Residuals Interbankt‐1m ‐ Annual change of in the residuals of a regression of the
Hungarian 3‐month interbank rate on GDP growth and the
 
‐0.006 0.024 ‐0.053 ‐0.006 0.054
 GDPt‐1q ‐ Annual growth rate in Hungarian gross domestic product 0.008 0.036 ‐0.080 0.017 0.047
 CPIt‐1m ‐ Annual change in the Hungarian consumer price index ‐0.004 0.027 ‐0.041 ‐0.010 0.067
Δ Exchange Ratet‐1m ‐ Annual change in the nominal effective exchange rate index of
the Forint
0.017 0.067 ‐0.115 0.018 0.158
Δ Exchange Rate Hungarian Forint to Eurot‐1 ‐ Annual change in the HUF/EUR exchange rate 0.017 0.070 ‐0.128 0.017 0.173
Δ Exchange Rate Hungarian Forint to CHFt‐1m ‐ Annual change in the HUF/CHF exchange rate 0.052 0.104 ‐0.158 0.042 0.249
Foreign Direct Investmentt‐1m ‐ Annual change in the stock of Hungarian foreign direct
investment
0.218 0.210 ‐0.047 0.162 0.758
Δ Credit Default Swap Spreadt‐1q ‐ Annual change in the Hungarian 5‐year sovereign CDS spreads 0.516 1.424 ‐3.532 0.187 4.189
Δ Yield Curvet‐1m ‐ Annual change in the difference between 10‐year and 1‐year 
government bond yields
0.000 0.010 ‐0.009 ‐0.004 0.027
Bank characteristics
Bank Capital Ratiobt‐1m ‐ Ratio of bank equity to total bank assets 0.13 0.15 ‐0.25 0.09 1.00
Bank Total Assetsbt‐1m 000,000 Forint Total bank assets 735,640 1,192,191 173 210,224 7,010,201
Ln(Bank Total Asset)bt‐1m ‐ Natural logarithm of total bank assets 12.18 1.81 5.15 12.26 15.76
Bank Liquidity Ratiobt‐1m ‐ Ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.99
Bank Return On Assetsbt‐1m ‐ Ratio of pretax profits to total bank assets 0.00 0.05 ‐2.29 0.00 0.29
Doubtful Loan Ratiobt‐1m ‐ Bank doubtful loan ratio 0.60 0.08 0.00 0.58 1.00
Foreign Owned Bankbt‐1m 0/1 =1 if bank is at least 50% foreign owned, =0 otherwise 0.93 0.25 0 1 1
Firm characteristics
Firm Capital Ratioit‐1y ‐ Ratio of firm equity to total firm assets 0.40 0.35 0.00 0.34 1.00
Firm Total Assetsit‐1y 000 Forint Total assets of the firm 122,737 587,597 18 9,593 7,275,757
Ln(Firm Total Assets)it‐1y ‐ Natural logarithm of firm total assets 9.17 2.30 2.89 9.17 15.80
Firm Liquidity Ratioit‐1y ‐ Ratio of current assets to total firm assets 0.72 0.30 0.00 0.83 1.00
Firm ROAit‐1y ‐ Ratio of net income to total firm assets ‐0.28 1.31 ‐9.41 0.00 0.92
Firm Export Sales Ratioit‐1y ‐ Ratio of export sales over total firm sales 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00
TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
NOTE. ‐‐ The number of observations in the sample equals 43,724,229. Regressions in Tables II‐VII are run employing a 10 percent random sample. The sample period is January 2005 to December
2011. Summary statistics for banks (firms) are based on the average values of the bank (firm) characteristics over the sample period. The time index on each variable indicates the timing of the
variable in the main regressions with t‐1 indicating a one‐period lag of a month (m ), quarter (q ) or year (y ), respectively. Given the frequency of reporting for GDP and CDS the values of the
preceding quarter and for firm characteristics the values of the preceding year are used. The number of banks in our sample is 39. The number of firms in our sample is 318,411.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms
Single‐Bank 
Firms
 Interest Rate ‐0.0101*** ‐0.0343*** ‐0.0134*** ‐0.0506***
(‐3.37) (‐6.64) (‐3.62) (‐6.43)
 Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio 0.2554*** 0.3914*** 0.4411***
(6.13) (5.58) (6.25)
 Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0067** 0.0327*** 0.0327*** 0.0284*** 0.0135**
(2.36) (4.24) (4.24) (4.36) (2.14)
 Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.2721*** ‐0.2721*** ‐0.2361*** ‐0.1370**
(‐3.80) (‐3.80) (‐3.95) (‐2.37)
 GDP 0.0021 0.0095** 0.0130*** 0.0249***
(0.53) (2.05) (3.07) (4.41)
 GDP * Bank Capital Ratio ‐0.0817*** ‐0.1291*** ‐0.0791*
(‐3.19) (‐3.11) (‐1.91)
 GDP * Credit Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0216*** ‐0.0308*** ‐0.0308*** ‐0.0264*** ‐0.0197***
(‐13.07) (‐7.02) (‐7.02) (‐7.04) (‐5.73)
 GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0948** 0.0948** 0.0767** 0.0650*
(2.19) (2.19) (2.08) (1.95)
 CPI 0.0031 ‐0.0075* 0.0024 ‐0.0203***
(1.26) (‐1.74) (0.76) (‐2.99)
 CPI * Bank Capital Ratio 0.1136*** 0.2421*** 0.2414***
(3.23) (3.85) (3.81)
 CPI * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0015 0.0255*** 0.0255*** 0.0192*** 0.0058
(0.56) (3.64) (3.64) (3.65) (1.24)
 CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.2569*** ‐0.2569*** ‐0.1855*** ‐0.0650
(‐3.80) (‐3.80) (‐3.85) (‐1.63)
Δ Exchange Rate ‐0.0007 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0008
(‐0.63) (‐0.76) (‐0.63) (‐0.76)
Foreign Direct Investment ‐0.0012*** ‐0.0012*** ‐0.0012*** ‐0.0012***
(‐2.87) (‐2.75) (‐2.87) (‐2.75)
Δ Credit Default Swap Spread 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0002***
(2.30) (2.59) (2.30) (2.59)
Δ Yield Curve ‐0.0093 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0093 ‐0.0098
(‐0.81) (‐0.85) (‐0.81) (‐0.85)
Bank Capital Ratio ‐0.0022 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0087***
(‐1.13) (‐0.25) (‐1.13) (‐1.15) (‐3.73)
Bank Total Assets ‐0.0010*** ‐0.0009*** ‐0.0010*** ‐0.0009*** ‐0.0001
(‐6.93) (‐6.74) (‐6.93) (‐6.74) (‐0.44)
Bank Liquidity Ratio ‐0.0079*** ‐0.0078*** ‐0.0079*** ‐0.0078*** ‐0.0027***
(‐10.36) (‐10.16) (‐10.36) (‐10.16) (‐3.11)
Bank Return On Assets 0.0009 0.0021 0.0009 0.0021 0.0030
(0.47) (1.07) (0.47) (1.07) (1.48)
Bank Doubtful Loan Ratio ‐0.0174*** ‐0.0178*** ‐0.0174*** ‐0.0178*** 0.0148***
(‐10.12) (‐10.02) (‐10.12) (‐10.02) (5.98)
Credit Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0029*** ‐0.0029*** ‐0.0027*** ‐0.0031*** ‐0.0031*** ‐0.0027*** ‐0.0020***
(‐41.80) (‐41.80) (‐37.49) (‐17.15) (‐17.15) (‐19.43) (‐15.06)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0022*
(2.59) (2.59) (3.21) (1.90)
Firm Capital Ratio 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0024***
(10.09) (10.13) (10.09) (10.13) (10.68)
Firm Total Assets ‐0.0003*** ‐0.0003*** ‐0.0003*** ‐0.0003*** ‐0.0002**
(‐3.97) (‐3.97) (‐3.97) (‐3.97) (‐2.18)
Firm Liquidity Ratio 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012***
(4.43) (4.41) (4.43) (4.41) (4.37)
Firm Return On Assets 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(8.45) (8.43) (8.45) (8.43) (6.20)
Firm Export Sales Ratio ‐0.0005 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0005 ‐0.0004
(‐1.20) (‐1.15) (‐1.20) (‐1.15) (‐0.96)
Constant 0.0308*** 0.0306*** 0.0307*** 0.0307*** 0.0024 0.0036*** 0.0024***
(14.53) (14.40) (14.49) (14.40) (0.86) (118.61) (83.85)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,075,500   2,075,500   2,075,500   2,075,500   2,075,500   2,385,314     1,762,190  
in Hungarian Forint or in Foreign Currency ‐ 0.0189 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
in Hungarian Forint  ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.0290 0.0326 ‐ ‐
in Foreign Currency ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.0088 0.0125 ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Foreign Currency and Hungarian Forint ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.0201 ‐0.0201 ‐0.0175 ‐0.0101
in Hungarian Forint or in Foreign Currency ‐ 8% ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
in Hungarian Forint  ‐ ‐ ‐ 13% 14% ‐ ‐
in Foreign Currency ‐ ‐ ‐ 4% 5% ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Foreign Currency and Hungarian Forint ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐9% ‐9% ‐8% ‐4%
TABLE II
THE GRANTING OF CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY TO BORROWERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY (EXTENSIVE MARGIN)
Percentage Point Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized Banks ( =2 Standard Dev
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized Banks ( =2 Standard Deviations) as 
Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐Time Credit in Sample ( = 0.23%)
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm is granted credit in domestic (foreign) currency
in a particular year:month conditional on having received no credit in this currency in the month before and equals zero otherwise. All independent variables are either lagged one month
or calculated over the preceding month. Table 1 lists the definition of all variables. Coefficients are listed in the first row, t‐statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "No"
indicates that the set of fixed effects is not included. "‐‐" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Time Fixed Effects include
an effect for every year:month. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
In Models (3) to (14): Other Bank Characteristic
Sample All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank 
 Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0500*** 0.0258** 0.0300*** 0.0153*** ‐0.0156 ‐0.0486* 0.0120 ‐0.0348 0.0275*** 0.0062 0.0578*** 0.0252*** 0.0482*** 0.0068
(4.00) (2.26) (4.94) (2.85) (‐0.49) (‐1.70) (0.36) (‐1.17) (4.54) (1.11) (6.03) (2.72) (2.83) (0.43)
 Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.4010*** ‐0.1675 ‐0.2408*** ‐0.1435** ‐0.3125*** ‐0.1858*** ‐0.2291*** ‐0.1439**
(‐3.40) (‐1.62) (‐4.02) (‐2.49) (‐4.94) (‐3.01) (‐3.83) (‐2.47)
 Interest Rate * Bank Characteristic  * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0164*** ‐0.0099*** 0.0014 0.0034* 0.0011 0.0034* ‐0.1254*** ‐0.0257 ‐0.1236*** ‐0.0301 ‐0.0210 0.0075
(‐4.88) (‐3.49) (0.65) (1.72) (0.50) (1.73) (‐3.97) (‐0.86) (‐3.72) (‐0.95) (‐1.27) (0.48)
 GDP * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0372*** ‐0.0288*** ‐0.0210*** ‐0.0143*** ‐0.0630*** ‐0.0253* ‐0.0704*** ‐0.0301* ‐0.0256*** ‐0.0178*** ‐0.0299*** ‐0.0222*** ‐0.0269*** ‐0.0193**
(‐5.29) (‐4.48) (‐7.35) (‐5.94) (‐3.58) (‐1.66) (‐3.90) (‐1.91) (‐7.60) (‐5.69) (‐5.54) (‐4.56) (‐2.86) (‐2.13)
 GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.1138* 0.1452** 0.0751** 0.0616* 0.0595 0.0526 0.0765** 0.0633*
(1.68) (2.44) (2.04) (1.86) (1.57) (1.55) (2.07) (1.88)
 GDP * Bank Characteristic  * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0024* 0.0013 0.0031*** 0.0008 0.0031*** 0.0008 0.0624*** 0.0396*** 0.0546*** 0.0373** 0.0004 ‐0.0003
(1.66) (1.15) (2.59) (0.79) (2.60) (0.73) (3.87) (2.62) (3.31) (2.42) (0.04) (‐0.03)
 CPI * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0033 ‐0.0097 0.0039 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0008 0.0134 0.0244 0.0211 0.0020 ‐0.0054 0.0139* 0.0001 0.0658*** 0.0205
(‐0.39) (‐1.31) (0.87) (‐0.52) (‐0.03) (0.60) (0.89) (0.89) (0.35) (‐1.05) (1.94) (0.02) (4.45) (1.36)
 CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0787 0.0218 ‐0.1794*** ‐0.0614 ‐0.1802*** ‐0.0821* ‐0.1627*** ‐0.0558
(‐1.08) (0.35) (‐3.71) (‐1.53) (‐3.67) (‐1.95) (‐3.37) (‐1.40)
 CPI * Bank Characteristic  * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0024 0.0001 0.0002 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0206 0.0251 0.0123 0.0398 ‐0.0503*** ‐0.0160
(‐0.95) (0.06) (0.09) (‐0.60) (‐0.22) (‐0.67) (‐0.62) (0.86) (0.36) (1.28) (‐3.39) (‐1.06)
 Exchange Rate * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0102** 0.0111***
(2.50) (3.02)
 Exchange Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0675* ‐0.1081***
(‐1.74) (‐3.15)
 FDI * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0028* ‐0.0029**
(‐1.74) (‐2.02)
 FDI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0081 0.0293**
(0.53) (2.20)
 Credit Default Swap Spread * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0009*** ‐0.0007***
(‐3.90) (‐3.45)
 Credit Default Swap Spread * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0053** 0.0051***
(2.47) (2.62)
Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0017*** ‐0.0011*** ‐0.0029*** ‐0.0021*** ‐0.0061*** ‐0.0033*** ‐0.0064*** ‐0.0034*** ‐0.0032*** ‐0.0026*** ‐0.0038*** ‐0.0029*** ‐0.0015*** ‐0.0007**
(‐4.74) (‐3.10) (‐24.82) (‐20.31) (‐7.40) (‐4.07) (‐7.52) (‐4.12) (‐24.44) (‐20.69) (‐20.11) (‐16.20) (‐4.44) (‐2.01)
Bank Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0007 ‐0.0055* 0.0040*** 0.0021* 0.0047*** 0.0030** 0.0045*** 0.0027**
(‐0.21) (‐1.76) (3.11) (1.78) (3.66) (2.45) (3.57) (2.37)
Bank Characteristic * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0001* 0.0051*** 0.0048*** 0.0059*** 0.0051*** ‐0.0013*** ‐0.0014***
(5.30) (4.83) (4.62) (1.87) (4.45) (1.77) (7.83) (8.05) (8.66) (8.33) (‐3.91) (‐4.21)
Constant 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0024***
(118.61) (83.86) (116.64) (82.06) (118.56) (83.82) (118.61) (83.84) (118.58) (83.86) (118.65) (83.89) (118.60) (83.83)
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,385,314 1,762,190 2,303,752 1,697,084 2,385,314 1,762,190 2,385,314 1,762,190 2,385,314 1,762,190 2,385,314 1,762,190 2,385,314 1,762,190
Difference in Impact Between Foreign Currency and Hungarian Forint due to
Bank Capital Ratio ‐13% ‐5% ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐8% ‐5% ‐ ‐ ‐10% ‐6% ‐7% ‐5%
Regulatory Bank Capital Ratio ‐ ‐ ‐7% ‐4% ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Bank Total Assets ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1% 1% 0% 1% ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Bank Liquidity Ratio ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐5% ‐1% ‐4% ‐1% ‐ ‐
Foreign Owned Bank ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1% 0%
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm is granted credit in domestic (foreign) currency in a particular year:month conditional on having received no credit in this currency in the month before and
equals zero otherwise. All independent variables are either lagged one month or calculated over the preceding month. Bank Regulatory Capital is the ratio of regulatory capital over risk‐weighted assets. Table 1 lists the definition of all other variables. Coefficients are listed in the first row, t‐statistics
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. Time Fixed Effects include an effect for every year:month. ***
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Larger/Higher Regulatory Capitalized, Sized, Liquid, Foreign‐Owned and/or Capitalized Banks ( =2 Standard Deviations) as Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐
Time Credit in Sample ( = 0.23%)
TABLE III
THE GRANTING OF CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY TO BORROWERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY (EXTENSIVE MARGIN), INTERACTIONS WITH MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES, BANK REGULATORY CAPITAL, SIZE AND LIQUIDITY, AND FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP
Bank Regulatory Capital 
Ratio
Bank Total Assets Bank Liquidity Ratio Foreign Owned Bank Additional Macroeconomic 
Variables in Interactions
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Sample
Sample All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank  All Firms Single‐Bank 
 Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0276*** 0.0231*** 0.1029*** 0.0763*** 0.0368*** 0.0182*
(3.87) (3.30) (6.10) (4.52) (3.69) (1.72)
 Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.2194*** ‐0.2091*** ‐0.7400*** ‐0.6309*** ‐0.2932*** ‐0.1827*
(‐3.50) (‐3.38) (‐4.94) (‐4.21) (‐3.17) (‐1.90)
 GDP * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0258*** ‐0.0182*** 0.0124 0.0221 ‐0.0340*** ‐0.0279***
(‐6.46) (‐4.81) (0.81) (1.55) (‐5.76) (‐4.75)
 GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.1126*** 0.0708** ‐0.1921 ‐0.1110 0.0667 0.0557
(3.05) (2.00) (‐1.39) (‐0.94) (1.14) (0.98)
 CPI * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0215*** 0.0136** ‐0.0057 ‐0.0122 0.0192** 0.0048
(4.05) (2.55) (‐0.57) (‐1.29) (2.55) (0.65)
 CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.1617*** ‐0.1192*** ‐0.0421 0.1102 ‐0.1984*** ‐0.0647
(‐3.69) (‐2.64) (‐0.48) (1.36) (‐2.94) (‐1.08)
Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency ‐0.0026*** ‐0.0019*** ‐0.0041*** ‐0.0035*** ‐0.0039*** ‐0.0032***
(‐17.75) (‐13.01) (‐9.93) (‐8.29) (‐18.39) (‐14.67)
Bank Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Foreign Currency 0.0054*** 0.0026** 0.0116*** 0.0082** 0.0062*** 0.0047**
(4.34) (2.09) (3.58) (2.42) (3.29) (2.48)
Constant 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 0.0051*** 0.0035*** 0.0053*** 0.0039***
(89.35) (69.22) (98.76) (69.90) (110.75) (77.14)
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,615,640 1,336,152 1,160,416 845,040 1,408,422 919,230
Difference in Impact Between Foreign Currency and Hungarian Forint ‐7% ‐7% ‐24% ‐20% ‐9% ‐6%
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized Banks (  =2 Standard 
Deviations) as Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐Time Credit in Sample ( = 0.23%)
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm is granted credit in domestic
(foreign) currency in a particular year:month conditional on having received no credit in this currency in the month before and equals zero otherwise. All independent variables
are either lagged one month or calculated over the preceding month. Table 1 lists the definition of all variables. Coefficients are listed in the first row, t‐statistics based on robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that
the set of fixed effects is included. Time Fixed Effects include an effect for every year:month. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
TABLE IV
THE GRANTING OF CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY TO BORROWERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CREDIT IN DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN CURRENCY (EXTENSIVE MARGIN), BY 
SAMPLE
Only Foreign Owned Banks 2005:01‐2008:09 Only Firms > Median in 
Total Assets
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms All Firms
Single‐Bank 
Firms
Δ Interest Rate ‐0.0059*** ‐0.0216*** ‐0.0104*** ‐0.0461***
(‐2.92) (‐6.19) (‐3.27) (‐6.15)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio 0.1657*** 0.3752*** 0.4099***
(5.90) (5.45) (5.94)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0066** 0.0369*** 0.0369*** 0.0322*** 0.0153**
(2.40) (4.92) (4.92) (5.08) (2.45)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.3176*** ‐0.3176*** ‐0.2763*** ‐0.1614***
(‐4.53) (‐4.53) (‐4.74) (‐2.81)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0068** 0.0365*** 0.0365*** 0.0321*** 0.0180***
(2.50) (4.92) (4.92) (5.11) (2.95)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.3108*** ‐0.3108*** ‐0.2734*** ‐0.1814***
(‐4.47) (‐4.47) (‐4.72) (‐3.21)
Δ GDP 0.0016 0.0059* 0.0195*** 0.0325***
(0.59) (1.85) (6.33) (6.76)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio ‐0.0473*** ‐0.1391*** ‐0.1061***
(‐2.69) (‐3.43) (‐2.63)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.0323*** ‐0.0493*** ‐0.0493*** ‐0.0430*** ‐0.0290***
(‐19.92) (‐11.49) (‐11.49) (‐11.71) (‐8.52)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.1811*** 0.1811*** 0.1530*** 0.1142***
(4.27) (4.27) (4.24) (3.46)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0215*** ‐0.0308*** ‐0.0308*** ‐0.0271*** ‐0.0211***
(‐13.80) (‐7.33) (‐7.33) (‐7.55) (‐6.39)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0812** 0.0746**
(2.26) (2.26) (2.29) (2.32)
Δ CPI 0.0025 ‐0.0053* 0.0026 ‐0.0203***
(1.47) (‐1.80) (0.95) (‐3.08)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio 0.0825*** 0.2436*** 0.2414***
(3.48) (3.88) (3.82)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.0028 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.0150*** 0.0037
(‐1.13) (2.91) (2.91) (2.97) (0.83)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.2382*** ‐0.2382*** ‐0.1789*** ‐0.0642*
(‐3.61) (‐3.61) (‐3.81) (‐1.68)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0024 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0198*** 0.0064
(0.94) (3.73) (3.73) (3.89) (1.42)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.2451*** ‐0.2451*** ‐0.1833*** ‐0.0628
(‐3.73) (‐3.73) (‐3.93) (‐1.62)
Credit Granted in Euro ‐0.0034*** ‐0.0034*** ‐0.0031*** ‐0.0038*** ‐0.0038*** ‐0.0034*** ‐0.0024***
(‐50.65) (‐50.65) (‐45.26) (‐21.65) (‐21.65) (‐24.66) (‐18.79)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0066*** 0.0039***
(4.38) (4.38) (5.27) (3.43)
Credit Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0033*** ‐0.0033*** ‐0.0031*** ‐0.0038*** ‐0.0038*** ‐0.0034*** ‐0.0023***
(‐50.79) (‐50.79) (‐46.17) (‐21.99) (‐21.99) (‐24.96) (‐18.50)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0065*** 0.0038***
(4.43) (4.43) (5.32) (3.39)
Constant 0.0217*** 0.0215*** 0.0216*** 0.0218*** 0.0040** 0.0036*** 0.0024***
(15.29) (15.16) (15.19) (15.24) (2.14) (95.22) (66.73)
Macroeconomic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Bank Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,113,250 3,113,250    3,113,250 3,113,250 3,113,250 3,577,971 2,643,285
in Hungarian Forint or in Foreign Currency 8% ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
in Hungarian Forint  ‐ ‐ ‐ 17% 19% ‐ ‐
In Euro ‐ ‐ ‐ 3% 4% ‐ ‐
in Swiss Franc ‐ ‐ ‐ 3% 5% ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Euro and Hungarian Forint ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐15% ‐15% ‐13% ‐8%
Difference in Impact Between Swiss Franc and Hungarian Forint ‐14% ‐14% ‐13% ‐8%
TABLE V
THE GRANTING OF CREDIT IN HUNGARIAN FORINT, EURO, OR SWISS FRANC TO BORROWERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CREDIT IN THOSE CURRENCIES (EXTENSIVE MARGIN)
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized Banks (  =2 Standard Deviations) as 
Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐Time Credit in The Sample (= 0.16%)
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm is granted credit in Hungarian Forint / Euro
/ Swiss Franc in a particular year:month conditional on having received no credit in this currency in the month before and equals zero otherwise. All independent variables are either
lagged one month or calculated over the preceding month. Table 1 lists the definition of all variables. Coefficients are listed in the first row, t‐statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects
is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects is not included. "‐‐" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Time
Fixed Effects include an effect for every year:month. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Dependent Variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample
All firms with 
debt
All firms with 
debt
All firms with 
debt
Single‐Bank 
firms with debt All Firms All Firms All Firms
Single‐Bank 
Firms
Δ Interest Rate 0.0409** ‐0.0667***
(2.03) (‐5.50)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio ‐0.3213 ‐0.3179 0.5384*** 0.5995***
(‐1.62) (‐1.61) (4.96) (5.51)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.0456** ‐0.0456** ‐0.0454** ‐0.0663** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 0.0352*** 0.0166*
(‐2.17) (‐2.17) (‐2.21) (‐2.57) (3.58) (3.58) (3.39) (1.78)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.4262** 0.4262** 0.4192** 0.5779** ‐0.4528*** ‐0.4528*** ‐0.3576*** ‐0.2202**
(2.00) (2.00) (2.01) (2.32) (‐3.99) (‐3.99) (‐3.79) (‐2.56)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0318 ‐0.0318 ‐0.0311 ‐0.0346 0.0570*** 0.0570*** 0.0479*** 0.0261***
(‐1.49) (‐1.49) (‐1.49) (‐1.31) (4.64) (4.64) (4.64) (2.83)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.2994 0.2994 0.2953 0.2792 ‐0.5242*** ‐0.5242*** ‐0.4300*** ‐0.2936***
(1.39) (1.39) (1.41) (1.11) (‐4.61) (‐4.61) (‐4.56) (‐3.45)
Δ GDP 0.0317** 0.0668***
(2.07) (7.36)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio ‐0.1373 ‐0.1845 ‐0.5041*** ‐0.4424***
(‐0.94) (‐1.26) (‐6.69) (‐5.94)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.0266* ‐0.0266* ‐0.0244* ‐0.0220 ‐0.1055*** ‐0.1055*** ‐0.0949*** ‐0.0616***
(‐1.79) (‐1.79) (‐1.70) (‐1.25) (‐12.13) (‐12.13) (‐12.85) (‐9.59)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.2063 0.2063 0.1770 0.1836 0.6881*** 0.6881*** 0.6119*** 0.4784***
(1.33) (1.33) (1.19) (1.07) (8.18) (8.18) (8.59) (7.67)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0429*** ‐0.0429*** ‐0.0427*** ‐0.0308* ‐0.0771*** ‐0.0771*** ‐0.0712*** ‐0.0486***
(‐2.81) (‐2.81) (‐2.91) (‐1.69) (‐9.29) (‐9.29) (‐10.11) (‐7.98)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.2228 0.2228 0.2165 0.1869 0.5464*** 0.5464*** 0.5003*** 0.4062***
(1.39) (1.39) (1.41) (1.04) (6.71) (6.71) (7.25) (6.80)
Δ CPI ‐0.0868*** ‐0.0322***
(‐4.48) (‐3.18)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio 0.8733*** 0.8453*** 0.3603*** 0.3608***
(4.22) (4.09) (3.98) (3.98)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.1006*** 0.1006*** 0.0943*** 0.0547*** 0.0275*** 0.0275*** 0.0173** 0.0061
(4.82) (4.82) (4.97) (2.82) (2.58) (2.58) (2.11) (0.83)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.8884*** ‐0.8884*** ‐0.8250*** ‐0.4437** ‐0.3228*** ‐0.3228*** ‐0.2061*** ‐0.0295
(‐3.93) (‐3.93) (‐4.04) (‐2.40) (‐3.29) (‐3.29) (‐2.86) (‐0.46)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0876*** 0.0876*** 0.0792*** 0.0257 0.0368*** 0.0368*** 0.0265*** 0.0103
(4.35) (4.35) (4.27) (1.31) (3.52) (3.52) (3.31) (1.38)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.9010*** ‐0.9010*** ‐0.8134*** ‐0.2406 ‐0.3391*** ‐0.3391*** ‐0.2309*** ‐0.0440
(‐4.17) (‐4.17) (‐4.11) (‐1.29) (‐3.53) (‐3.53) (‐3.27) (‐0.67)
Credit Granted in Euro ‐0.0084*** ‐0.0084*** ‐0.0084*** ‐0.0094*** ‐0.0123*** ‐0.0123*** ‐0.0110*** ‐0.0046***
(‐15.74) (‐15.74) (‐17.32) (‐16.09) (‐22.54) (‐22.53) (‐24.83) (‐11.62)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0168*** 0.0168*** 0.0163*** 0.0258*** ‐0.0023 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0205***
(3.05) (3.05) (3.32) (4.64) (‐0.44) (‐0.44) (‐0.21) (‐5.00)
Credit Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0082*** ‐0.0082*** ‐0.0081*** ‐0.0087*** ‐0.0134*** ‐0.0134*** ‐0.0119*** ‐0.0048***
(‐15.70) (‐15.70) (‐17.09) (‐15.03) (‐24.34) (‐24.34) (‐26.68) (‐12.42)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0161*** 0.0161*** 0.0156*** 0.0226*** 0.0037 0.0037 0.0039 ‐0.0191***
(2.98) (2.98) (3.20) (4.09) (0.71) (0.71) (0.95) (‐4.73)
Constant ‐0.0097*** 0.0001 0.0085*** 0.0080*** 0.0275*** ‐0.0072** 0.0128*** 0.0072***
(‐3.25) (0.03) (90.19) (64.36) (9.80) (‐2.00) (89.16) (64.10)
Macroeconomic variables Yes No No No Yes No No No
Bank Characteristics Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes ‐‐ ‐‐ Yes Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Time Fixed Effects No Yes ‐‐ ‐‐ No Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,117,353 1,117,353 1,160,565 617,775 3,113,250 3,113,250 3,577,971 2,643,285
in Hungarian Forint  ‐19% ‐19% ‐ ‐ 8% 9% ‐ ‐
in Euro 6% 7% ‐ ‐ 1% 2% ‐ ‐
in Swiss Franc ‐1% ‐1% ‐ ‐ 0% 1% ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Euro and Hungarian Forint 26% 26% 25% 35% ‐7% ‐7% ‐5% ‐3%
Difference in Impact Between Swiss Franc and Hungarian Forint 18% 18% 18% 17% ‐8% ‐8% ‐6% ‐4%
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable Ending Credit is a dummy that equals one if the firm has no more credit in Hungarian Forint / Euro / Swiss Franc in a
particular year:month conditional on having had credit in this currency in the month before and equals zero otherwise. The dependent variable Increasing the Amount of Credit is a dummy that equals one if the firm
increases the nominal amount of credit it receives in Hungarian Forint / Euro / Swiss Franc and equals zero otherwise. All independent variables are either lagged one month or calculated over the preceding month. Table
1 lists the definition of all variables. Coefficients are listed in the first row, t‐statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding
significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects is not included. "‐‐" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are
comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Time Fixed Effects include an effect for every year:month. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
TABLE VI
THE REPAYMENT OF CREDIT BY BORROWERS WITH CREDIT IN HUNGARIAN FORINT, EURO, AND SWISS FRANC (NEGATIVE EXTENSIVE MARGIN) AND THE INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT BORROWERS HOLD IN 
HUNGARIAN FORINT, EURO, OR SWISS FRANC (INTENSIVE MARGIN)
ENDING CREDIT (NEGATIVE EXTENSIVE MARGIN) INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT (INTENSIVE MARGIN)
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Ending Credit and Increasing the Amount of Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized Banks ( =2 Standard Deviations) As Percent of 
Unconditional Probability of Ending Credit  ( =0.12%) and Increasing The Amount of Credit  ( =0.51%)  in Sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Firms All Firms All Firms Single‐Bank Firms
Δ Interest Rate ‐0.0545***
(‐6.43)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio 0.4385*** 0.4661***
(5.96) (6.30)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0457*** 0.0457*** 0.0383*** 0.0213***
(5.62) (5.62) (5.68) (3.24)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.3831*** ‐0.3831*** ‐0.3161*** ‐0.1936***
(‐5.07) (‐5.07) (‐5.15) (‐3.29)
Δ Interest Rate * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0422*** 0.0422*** 0.0354*** 0.0217***
(5.25) (5.25) (5.30) (3.37)
Δ Interest Rate * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.3601*** ‐0.3601*** ‐0.3000*** ‐0.2010***
(‐4.81) (‐4.81) (‐4.92) (‐3.47)
Δ Interest Rate  in Euro Area ‐0.0695
(‐1.60)
Δ Interest Rate in Euro Area* Bank Capital Ratio 0.3985 0.4517
(1.08) (1.23)
Δ Interest Rate  in Euro Area * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.1094** 0.1094** 0.1148*** 0.0873***
(2.52) (2.52) (3.23) (2.64)
Δ Interest Rate  in Euro Area * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.3633 ‐0.3633 ‐0.4330 ‐0.4464
(‐0.93) (‐0.93) (‐1.38) (‐1.53)
Δ Interest Rate  in Euro Area * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.1018** 0.1018** 0.1131*** 0.0925***
(2.43) (2.43) (3.29) (2.87)
Δ Interest Rate  in Euro Area * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.4129 ‐0.4129 ‐0.5158* ‐0.5481*
(‐1.09) (‐1.09) (‐1.70) (‐1.94)
Δ Interest Rate in Switzerland 0.5153***
(11.03)
Δ Interest Rate  in Switzerland * Bank Capital Ratio ‐2.9439*** ‐2.9235***
(‐7.17) (‐7.10)
Δ Interest Rate in Switzerland * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.5037*** ‐0.5037*** ‐0.4256*** ‐0.3834***
(‐10.46) (‐10.46) (‐10.88) (‐9.82)
Δ Interest Rate  in Switzerland * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 2.6950*** 2.6950*** 2.0223*** 1.9931***
(6.31) (6.31) (6.00) (5.87)
Δ Interest Rate  in Switzerland * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.3908*** ‐0.3908*** ‐0.3328*** ‐0.3199***
(‐8.20) (‐8.20) (‐8.63) (‐8.14)
Δ Interest Rate in Switzerland * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 2.3287*** 2.3287*** 1.7968*** 1.8049***
(5.55) (5.55) (5.46) (5.35)
Δ GDP ‐0.0508***
(‐3.59)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio 0.4345*** 0.4422***
(3.35) (3.39)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0381*** 0.0381*** 0.0231** 0.0358***
(2.58) (2.58) (1.99) (3.25)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.3592*** ‐0.3592*** ‐0.1955* ‐0.2235**
(‐2.66) (‐2.66) (‐1.91) (‐2.40)
Δ GDP * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0313** 0.0313** 0.0167 0.0264**
(2.09) (2.09) (1.42) (2.35)
Δ GDP * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.3383** ‐0.3383** ‐0.1840* ‐0.1831**
(‐2.50) (‐2.50) (‐1.79) (‐1.96)
Δ CPI ‐0.0761***
(‐7.84)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio 0.6147*** 0.6015***
(6.82) (6.65)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0776*** 0.0776*** 0.0601*** 0.0474***
(7.61) (7.61) (7.52) (6.38)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro ‐0.5912*** ‐0.5912*** ‐0.4176*** ‐0.2973***
(‐6.18) (‐6.18) (‐5.76) (‐4.75)
Δ CPI * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0671*** 0.0671*** 0.0508*** 0.0393***
(6.58) (6.58) (6.34) (5.24)
Δ CPI * Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.5308*** ‐0.5308*** ‐0.3705*** ‐0.2476***
(‐5.63) (‐5.63) (‐5.19) (‐3.92)
Credit Granted in Euro ‐0.0042*** ‐0.0042*** ‐0.0037*** ‐0.0027***
(‐20.36) (‐20.36) (‐22.86) (‐17.70)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Euro 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0077*** 0.0053***
(5.32) (5.32) (5.63) (4.11)
Credit Granted in Swiss Franc ‐0.0040*** ‐0.0040*** ‐0.0035*** ‐0.0025***
(‐19.87) (‐19.87) (‐22.29) (‐16.69)
Bank Capital Ratio * Credit Is Granted in Swiss Franc 0.0092*** 0.0092*** 0.0071*** 0.0047***
(5.09) (5.09) (5.40) (3.73)
Constant 0.0165*** 0.0055*** 0.0036*** 0.0024***
(11.06) (2.91) (95.23) (66.76)
Macroeconomic variables Yes No No No
Bank Characteristics Yes Yes No No
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes No No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Time Fixed Effects No Yes ‐‐ ‐‐
Firm ‐ Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,113,250 3,113,250 3,577,971 2,643,285
in Hungarian Forint  20% 22% ‐ ‐
in Euro 3% 4% ‐ ‐
in Swiss Franc 4% 5% ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Euro and Hungarian Forint ‐18% ‐18% ‐15% ‐9%
Difference in Impact Between Swiss Franc and Hungarian Forint ‐17% ‐17% ‐14% ‐9%
in Hungarian Forint  ‐137% ‐136% ‐ ‐
in Euro ‐12% ‐11% ‐ ‐
in Swiss Franc ‐29% ‐28% ‐ ‐
Difference in Impact Between Euro and Hungarian Forint 125% 125% 94% 93%
Difference in Impact Between Swiss Franc and Hungarian Forint 108% 108% 84% 84%
Difference in Impact Between Hungarian Forint and Swiss Franc ‐108% ‐108% ‐84% ‐84%
Difference in Impact Between Euro and Swiss Franc ‐17% ‐17% ‐10% ‐9%
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports estimates from ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm is granted credit in
Hungarian Forint / Euro / Swiss Franc in a particular year:month conditional on having received no credit in this currency in the month before and equals zero
otherwise. All independent variables are either lagged one month or calculated over the preceding month. Table 1 lists the definition of all variables. Coefficients
are listed in the first row, t‐statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the
corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of fixed effects is included. "No" indicates that the set of fixed effects is
not included. "‐‐" indicates that the indicated set of fixed effects are comprised in the wider included set of fixed effects. Time Fixed Effects include an effect for
every year:month. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
TABLE VII
THE GRANTING OF CREDIT IN HUNGARIAN FORINT, EURO, AND SWISS FRANC TO BORROWERS CURRENTLY WITHOUT CREDIT IN THOSE CURRENCIES (EXTENSIVE 
MARGIN), EFFECTS OF EURO AND SWISS FRANC INTEREST RATES
Percentage Point Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Forint Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher
Capitalized Banks (  =2 Standard Deviations) as Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐Time Credit in Sample ( = 0.16%)
Difference in Impact of a Decrease in Swiss Franc Interest Rate by 25 bps on the Likelihood of Granting of First‐Time Credit by Lower versus Higher Capitalized
Banks ( Δ=2 Standard Deviations) as Percent of Unconditional Probability of Granting First‐Time Credit in Sample ( = 0.16%)
